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Abstract
In this paper, the physical layer security of a dual-hop underlay uplink cognitive radio network
is investigated over Nakagami-m fading channels. Specifically, multiple secondary sources (Si)1≤i≤N
are taking turns in accessing the licensed spectrum of the primary users and communicating with a
multi-antenna secondary base station (D) through the aid of a multi-antenna relay R in the presence
of M eavesdroppers (Ek)1≤k≤M that are also equipped with multiple antennas. Among the remaining
nodes, one jammer is randomly selected to transmit an artificial noise to disrupt all the eavesdroppers
that are attempting to intercept the communication of the legitimate links i.e., Si-R and R-D. The
received signals at each node are combined using maximum-ratio combining. Secrecy analysis is
provided by deriving closed-form and asymptotic expressions for the secrecy outage probability. The
impact of several key parameters on the system’s secrecy e.g., transmit power of the sources, number
of eavesdroppers, maximum tolerated interference power, and the number of diversity branches is
investigated. Importantly, by considering two scenarios, namely (i) absence and (ii) presence of a friendly
jammer, new insights are obtained for the considered communication system. Especially, we tend to
answer to the following question: Can better secrecy be achieved without jamming by considering a
single antenna at eavesdroppers and multiple-ones at the legitimate users (i.e., relay and end-user) rather
than sending permanently an artificial noise and considering that both the relay and the destination are
equipped with a single antenna, while multiple antennas are used by the eavesdroppers? The obtained
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2results are corroborated through Monte Carlo simulation and show that the system’s security can be
enhanced by adjusting the aforementioned parameters.
Index Terms
Cognitive Radio Networks, Eavesdropping, Jamming signals, Physical Layer Security, Secrecy
outage probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing number of mobile users led to an unprecedented demand for spectral resources.
In this regard, cognitive radio has emerged as a new paradigm that enhances the spectrum
efficiency by allowing its reuse [1]. In underlay cognitive radio networks (CRNs), the issue
of radio-frequency spectrum scarcity is alleviated by allowing the secondary users (SUs) to
share the spectrum with primary users (PUs) under the condition of not causing any harmful
interference to them. Consequently, the SUs are required to continuously adjust their transmit
powers in order to meet the PUs’ quality of service (QoS). Under such constraints, ensuring the
physical layer security (PLS) of multi-hop CRNs becomes a challenge of utmost importance.
To remedy this problem, several techniques can be used to strengthen the secrecy capacity
at each hop namely increasing the number of diversity branches at the receivers, sending a
jamming signal with the highest power, increasing maximum transmit power at the source and
maximum tolerated interference power as well, reducing the number of hops, employing zero-
forcing precoding techniques, involving energy harvesting (EH) and non-orthogonal multiple
access (NOMA) technique etc.
Recently, the PLS of CRNs has been the focus of many recent research works. For instance,
non-cooperative CRNs were considered in [2]-[5], therein all receivers i.e., both destination and
eavesdropper were assumed to be equipped with multiple antennas and perform the selection
combining (SC) technique. Particularly, in [2], the source is also assumed to be a multi-antennas
node performing transmit antenna selection, while in [3] the secrecy performance is investigated
for both secondary and primary networks. Closed-form and asymptotic expressions for the
secrecy outage probability (SOP) were derived under Rayleigh [3], [4] and Nakagami-m [2], [5]
fading models.
The PLS of multi-relays dual-hop CRNs was explored in [6]-[9]. Specifically, in [6] and
[7], the communication was performed in the presence of only one eavesdropper attempting to
3overhear the communication channel, while multiple eavesdroppers were considered in [8] and
[9]. Furthermore, In [6], optimal and suboptimal relay selection were analyzed while in [7] the
relay that minimizes the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the wiretap link was chosen. Besides,
in [8], the most threatening eavesdropper is selected first according to the maximum SNR of
the wiretap links between the source and the eavesdroppers. Next, the best relay minimizing the
SNR at the selected eavesdropper is then chosen. In [9], the relay that maximizes the achievable
secrecy rate is selected. Under these conditions, closed-form and asymptotic expressions for
the SOP and intercept probability (IP) were derived over either Nakagami-m [6] or Rayleigh
[7]-[9] fading channels. The IP and SOP analysis of cooperative underlay EH-based CRNs have
been investigated in [10] and [10]-[14], respectively. Specifically, the SUs have been assumed to
harvest energy from the PU’s signals in [10]-[12]. In contrast, in [13]-[14] the relay is harvesting
energy from the SU signals instead.
The PLS of NOMA-based CRNs has been investigated in [15]-[16]. In [15], an overlay NOMA
CRN was considered such that the SUs were assumed to be eavesdroppers, while the PLS of
mmWave NOMA CRN was investigated in [16]. Closed-form expressions for the connection
outage probability, SOP and secrecy throughput were derived over Nakagami-m fading channels.
PLS analysis through the aid of a friendly jammer was discussed in [17]-[19]. In [17], the IP
was derived by considering multiple source-destination pairs communicating under eavesdropping
attempts of only one eavesdropper, with the source cooperation aided opportunistic jamming.
In [18], the SOP of dual-hop aided opportunistic jamming CRNs is investigated. In this work,
one relay is selected to forward the information while another one is chosen to disrupt the
eavesdropper by sending an artificial noise. Also, in the two aforementioned works, several
selection policies of the friendly jammer were considered. The impact of the friendly jammer’s
transmit power in the presence of multiple eavesdroppers by considering a direct communication
link between multiple sources and one destination is discussed in [19].
In this work, we investigate the joint impact of the friendly jammer’s transmit power, multiple
SUs with power adaptation constraint, number of eavesdroppers, number of diversity branches,
maximum tolerated interference power at the PU receiver on the PLS of a cooperative underlay
uplink CRNs under Nakagami-m fading model. Without loss of generality, it is worth mentioning
that each user is transmitting its data independently from other users. Consequently, the sources
are assumed to transmit in turns their data while a friendly jammer is randomly selected among
the remaining idle sources to transmit an artificial noise so as to disrupt the eavesdroppers. In
4this scheme, the nodes R, D, Ek perform MRC technique, hence the knowledge of the channel
state information (CSI) at these nodes is necessary. For this reason, we assume that the CSI is
available. Additionally, eavesdroppers are considered are passive.
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
• The PLS of an underlay uplink dual-hop CRN operating under Nakagami-m fading envi-
ronment is investigated by deriving closed-form and asymptotic expressions for the SOP of
the overall system under two scenarios namely, (i) presence and (ii) absence of a friendly
jammer.
• Under the power adaptation constraint of the SUs, the joint impact of the discussed param-
eters on the system’s security is investigated.
• We show that the system’s security is enhanced in the presence of an important number
of eavesdroppers by increasing the (i) SUs’ transmit powers (ii) number of legitimate
destination branches (iii) and maximum tolerated interference power.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the system and channel models
are presented. Closed-form as well as asymptotic expressions for the SOP are derived in Section
III. In Section IV, the numerical and simulation results are provided and discussed for various
key parameters’ values. Finally, this work is concluded in Section V.
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODELS
The considered two-hops CRN, represented in Fig. 1, consists of multiple sources (Si)i=1,..,N ,
one LR-antennas relay R, multiple LEk-antennas eavesdroppers (Ek)k=1,..,M , one destination D
equipped with LD antennas, one PU transmitter (PTx), and one PU receiver (PRx). For the
sake of simplicity, we assume that the relay receives the transmitted signals from Si on the LR
antennas and uses only one antenna to forward the message to D. Moreover, we consider multi-
user scheduling such that, at any given moment, only one user is transmitting its data. Also, the
source nodes are taking rounds in accessing the spectrum and a friendly jammer SJ is randomly
selected among N − 1 remaining nodes to send an artificial noise. This latter can be canceled
by legitimate nodes, while Ek cannot mitigate it, leading to an increase in the secrecy capacity.
Similarly to [17], we assume that a friendly jammer generates an artificial noise using a pseudo-
random sequence that is known to the legitimate users which allows them to cancel out this
noise, while this sequence remains unknown to the illegitimate ones. To this end, the main aim
of this work is to investigate the impact of a friendly jammer, legitimate, and wiretap channels’
5average SNRs, maximum tolerated interference power as well as the spatial diversity at both the
relay and the end-user on the secrecy performance of the considered communication system. In
this scheme, Nakagami-m fading model is considered for all links. The fading amplitudes of
links Si → R, R → (Dt)1≤t≤LD , Si → Ek, R → Ek, R → PRx, Si → PRx are denoted by
hq where q = {SiR, RDt, SiEk, REk, RP, SiP}. Consequently, the channel gains gq = |hq|2
are Gamma distributed with probability density function (PDF) and cumulative density function
(CDF) are given by
fgq(x) =
λ
mq
q
Γ(mq)
xmq−1e−λqx, (1)
Fgq (x) =
γ (mq, λqx)
Γ (mq)
, (2)
where λq =
mq
Ωq
, mq and Ωq denote the fading severity and the average channel power gain,
respectively, Γ (.) and γ (., .) are the Euler and the lower incomplete Gamma functions [21, Eqs.
(8.310.1), (8.350.1)], respectively. For a natural number mq, the above CDF can be written as
[13, Eq. (8.352.1)]
Fgq (x) = 1− e−λqx
mq−1∑
k=0
λkqx
k
k!
. (3)
The received signals at R, Ek at both hops, and D are given, respectively, by
y
(i)
R =
√
PSi ||hSiR||xSi + wSiRnR, i = 1, .., N, (4)
y
(i)
1Ek
=
√
PSi ||hSiEk ||xSi + 
√
PSJ ||hSJEk ||xSJ + wSiEknEk , (5)
k = 1, ..,M, i = 1, .., N, J 6= i,
y2Ek =
√
PR||hREk ||xR + wREknEk , k = 1, ..,M, (6)
yD =
√
PR||hRD||xR + wRDnD, (7)
with
 =
0, Absence of a jammer1, Presence of a jammer .
Here, Pn and xn denote the transmit power and signal from the node n, respectively where
n = {Si, R}, wq = h
†
q
||hq || , q = {SiR, SiEk, REk, RD}, while hq denotes Ln × 1, channel
vector of the links Si-R, Si-Ek, R-D, † denotes the transpose conjugate, and ||.|| represents the
Frobenius norm. Also, nR, nD, and nEk , denote the Nn×1 additive white Gaussian noise vector
6at R, D, and Ek, respectively. For the sake of simplicity, all noise power vectors’ components
are considered equal N0.
Throughout the transmission process, both Si, and R have to adapt their transmit powers so
as to avoid causing harmful interference to the PUs. Thus, the transmit power of the source
and the relay R taking into consideration the maximum constraint power can be, respectively,
expressed as
PSi = min
(
PmaxSi ,
PI
gSiP
)
; i = 1, .., N, (8)
and
PR = min
(
PmaxR ,
PI
gRP
)
, (9)
where PmaxSi and P
max
R denote the maximum transmit power at Si, and R, respectively, while
PI accounts for the maximum tolerated interference power at PRx.
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Fig. 1: System setup.
III. SECRECY OUTAGE PROBABILITY
In this section, we start by defining the secrecy capacities for the two hops’ links. Next, we
present the SOP analysis in terms of both closed-form and asymptotic expressions for various
cases of fading severity parameters, specifically, those of the legitimate and the wiretap links
of the first hop. Also, two scenarios will be considered, namely, the presence and absence of a
friendly jammer.
7A. Secrecy Capacity
The secrecy capacity can be defined as the maximum rate at which the transmitted information
can confidentially reach its intended destination. In our considered system, the secrecy capacities
in the case of presence and absence of a friendly jammer are given, respectively, by
C(i,J)s = min
k=1,..,M
(
C
(i, k,J)
1S , C
(k)
2S
)
, (10)
C(i)s = min
k=1,..,M
(
C
(i, k)
1S , C
(k)
2S
)
, (11)
where
• C(i, k,J)1S and C
(i, k)
1S denote the secrecy capacities at the first hop, i.e., the difference between
the capacity of the main link Si − R and the one of the wiretap channel Si − Ek in the
presence and absence of a friendly jammer, respectively, and can be written as
C
(i,k,J)
1S =

log2
(
1 + γ
(i)
R
1 + γ
(i,k,J)
1E
)
, γ
(i)
R > γ
(i,k,J)
1E
0, elsewhere
, (12)
C
(i,k)
1S =

log2
(
1 + γ
(i)
R
1 + γ
(i,k)
1E
)
, γ
(i)
R > γ
(i,k)
1E
0, elsewhere
, (13)
where γ(i)R denotes the instantaneous SNR at R, while γ
(i,k,J)
1E and γ
(i,k)
1E stand for the SNRs
at the eavesdropper Ek in the presence and absence of a friendly jammer, respectively, and
are given by
γ
(i)
R = min
(
γSi ,
γI
gSiP
) LR∑
u=1
gSiRu , (14)
γ
(i,k,J)
1E =
min
(
γSi ,
γI
gSiP
)∑LEk
u=1 gSiE(u)k
min
(
γSJ ,
γI
gSJP
)∑LEk
u=1 gSJE(u)k
+ 1
, (15)
γ
(i,k)
1E = min
(
γSi ,
γI
gSiP
) LEk∑
u=1
g
SiE
(u)
k
, (16)
and γSi = P
max
Si
/N0, γI = PI/N0, and γSJ = P
max
SJ
/N0.
8• C(k)2S is the secrecy capacity of the second hop, representing the difference between the
capacity of the link R−D and the one of the wiretap channel R− Ek
C
(k)
2S =

log2
(
1 + γD
1 + γ
(k)
2E
)
, γD > γ
(k)
2E
0, elsewhere
, (17)
where γD, and γ
(k)
2E denote the instantaneous SNR of the main link R−D and the channel
R− Ek, respectively and are given as
γD = min
(
γR,
γI
gRP
) LD∑
t=1
gRDt , (18)
γ
(k)
2E = min
(
γR,
γI
gRP
) LEk∑
u=1
g
RE
(u)
k
, (19)
with γR = PmaxR /N0.
Remark 1. • One can see from (14) and (15), that the PHY layer security at the first hop
in the presence of a friendly jammer can be enhanced by increasing separately γI , γSi ,
or γSJ . Indeed, the increasing scale of the SNR at the relay exceeds the one of the kth
eavesdropper as a jamming signal is added to the one received by Ek. However, in the
absence of a friendly jammer, one can see from (14) and (16) that only the impact of
legitimate and wiretap channels’ parameters can make the distinction between the two
associated SNRs. Consequently, the smaller λSiR, the greater the secrecy capacity and then
the security gets improved.
• From (18) and (19), it can be noticed that increasing either γR or γI enhances more the
capacity of the legitimate link as D performs the MRC technique. Additionally, increasing
the number of antennas at the receiver increases the SNR at D. Consequently, the system’s
security gets enhanced as well.
B. Exact Secrecy Outage Probability
In this paper, the SOP is chosen as a performance metric and it accounts for the probability
that the secrecy capacity is less than a predefined secrecy rate Rs. For the considered system, the
N sources are taking rounds in accessing the spectrum then one jammer is randomly selected
among the N − 1 remaining sources. The SOP if there were no jamming, can be expressed as
SOP =
1
N
N∑
i=1
SOP (i), (20)
9while in the presence of a jammer, it becomes [17]
SOP =
1
N(N − 1)
N∑
i=1
N∑
J=1
J 6=i
SOP (i,J), (21)
where SOP (i) and SOP (i,J) account for SOP of the system linking Si with D in the presence
of eavesdroppers, and in the absence and presence of the J th friendly jammer, respectively. The
SOP of the considered system stands for the probability that at least one of the secrecy capacities
falls below a predefined secrecy rate Rs, namely
SOP (i,J) = 1−
M∏
k=1
Pr
(
min(C
(i, k,J)
1S , C
(k)
2S ) ≥ Rs
)
(22)
= 1−
M∏
k=1
[
1− SOP (i,k,J)1
] [
1− SOP (k)2
]
,
and
SOP (i) = 1−
M∏
k=1
[
1− SOP (i,k)1
] [
1− SOP (k)2
]
, (23)
where SOP (i,k,J)1 and SOP
(i,k)
1 stand for the secrecy capacities at the first hop in the presence
and absence of a friendly jammer, respectively, and SOP (k)2 represents the secrecy capacity at the
second hop. One can see from (22) and (23) that the computation of SOP requires the knowledge
of SOP (i,k,J)1 , SOP
(i,k)
1 , and SOP
(k)
2 as well.
Remark 2. As SOP (i,k,J)1 , SOP
(i)
1 , and SOP
(k)
2 are between 0 and 1, it is worth mentioning that
the greater is M , the greater is SOP (approaches 1), and then the system becomes vulnerable
to eavesdropping attack.
Theorem 1. The closed-form expressions of SOP (i,k,J)1 , SOP
(i,k)
1 , and SOP
(k)
2 under Nakagami-
m fading model are given by (24), (25), and (26), respectively, as shown at the top of the
next page, where $(k)i = γλSiR + λSiEk , σi = γI/γSi , δ = γI/γR, γ = 2
RS , θ
(k,J)
i =
λSJEk/
(
γSJλSiEk
)
, ϕJ = λSJPγI/γSJ , ς
(k,J)
i = λSJEk/ (λSJPλSiEk) , ϕR = λRPγI/γR, ϕSi =
λSiPγP/γSi ,
M(h,l)1 (z) = G2,22,3
z
∣∣∣∣∣∣ −h, 1;−µ(h,l)i,k , LEkmSJEk ; 0
 , (27)
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SOP
(i,k,J)
1 = 1−
γ (mSiP , ϕSi) Γ
(
LRmSiR,
σiξSiR
γI
)
+M3
(
ξSiR
λSiP γI
)
Γ(LRmSiR)Γ (mSiP )
+
γα
(k,J)
i
Γ (mSiP )
LEkmSiEk−1∑
h=0
Ω
(i,k)
h
LRmSiR−1∑
l=0
Υ
(i)
l (γI)
−LRmSiR+l+1(
$
(k)
i
)LEkmSiEk+l−h
×
γ (mSiP , ϕSi) e−σiξSiRγI
σ
−LRmSiR+l+1
i
+
λ
mSiP
SiP
Γ
(
mSiP + LRmSiR − l − 1, ϕSi + σiξSiRγI
)
(
λSiP +
ξSiR
γI
)mSiP+LRmSiR−l−1

×
[
γ (mSJP , ϕJ)M(h,l)1
(
$
(k)
i θ
(k,J)
i
)
+M(h,l)2
(
ς
(k,J)
i $
(k)
i
γI
)]
. (24)
SOP
(i,k)
1 = 1−
λ
LRmSiR
SiR
γ
Γ (LEkmSiEk) Γ(LRmSiR)Γ (mSiP )
LRmSiR−1∑
l=0
Υ
(i)
l γ
−LRmSiR+l+1
I
(γλSiR)
l+1
G1,22,2
 λSiEk
λSiRγ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ −l, 1;−LEkmSiEk ; 0
(25)
×
γ (mSiP , ϕSi) e−σiξSiRγI
σ
−LRmSiR+l+1
i
+
λ
mSiP
SiP
Γ
(
mSiP + LRmSiR − l − 1, ϕSi + σiξSiRγI
)
(
λSiP +
ξSiR
γI
)mSiP+LRmSiR−l−1
 .
M(h,l)2 (z) = G2,33,3
z
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (1−mSJP , ϕJ) , (1, 0), (−h, 0);−(LEkmSJEk , 0),(µ(h,l)i,k , 0) ; (0, 0)
 , (28)
µ
(h,l)
i,k = LEkmSiEk − h+ l, (29)
ξv = λv (γ − 1) ; v = {SiR,RD}, (30)
M3 (z) = G2,12,2
z
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (1−mSiP , ϕSi) ; (1, 0)(0, 0) , (LRmSiR, 0);−
 , (31)
Ω
(i,k)
h =
(
LEkmSiEk−1
h
)
λ
LEkmSiEk−h−1
SiEk
, (32)
α
(k,J)
i =
β
(J)
k λ
LRmSiR
SiR
Γ (LEkmSiEk) Γ(LRmSiR)
, (33)
β
(J)
k =
1
Γ (LEkmSJEk) Γ(mSJP )
, (34)
Υ
(i)
l =
(
LRmSiR − 1
l
)
γl (γ − 1)LRmSiR−1−l , (35)
11
SOP
(k)
2 = 1−
λLDmRDRD
Γ (LEkmREk) Γ(LDmRD)Γ(mRP )
LDmRD−1∑
j=0
Bjγ−LDmRD+j+1I
λj+1RD
G1,22,2
 λREk
λRDγ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ −j, 1;−LEkmREk ; 0
(26)
×
e− δξRDγI γ (mRP , ϕR)
δ−LDmRD+j+1
+
λmRPRP Γ
(
LDmRD +mRP − j − 1, ϕR + δξRDγI
)
(
ξRD
γI
+ λRP
)LDmRD+mRP−j−1
 .
Bj =
(
LDmRD − 1
j
)
(γ − 1)LDmRD−1−j , (36)
where Gm,np,q
z
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (al)l≤p(bu)u≤q
 denotes the Meijer’s G-function [21, Eq. (9.301)], Gm,np,q
z
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (al, bl)l≤p(cu, du)u≤q

accounts for the upper incomplete Meijer’s G-function [22, Eq. (1.1.1)], and Γ (., .) denotes the
upper incomplete Gamma function [21, Eq. (8.350.2)].
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix A.
C. Asymptotic Secrecy Outage Probability
In this subsection, we provide an asymptotic analysis of the derived closed-form expressions
of the SOP. The expressions given in (24), (25), and (26) can be approximated for SNR regime
by considering γP →∞.
Theorem 2. The Asymptotic expression of the SOP in the absence of a jammer is given by (50)
as shown in the next page, while it is expressed in the presence of a jamming signal depending
on various cases as follows
• LRmSiR < LEkmSJEk
SOP (i,k,J) ∼ 1−
M∏
k=1
AREk,RD,D (1) (37)
−
∑M
k=1
∏M
j=1
j 6=k
AREj ,RD,D (1)
γI
×AREk,RD,R,D
(
1− P (SiR) C(i,k,J)1
)
,
12
SOP (i) ∼ 1−
M∏
k=1
AREk,RD,D (1)ASiEk,SiR,R (1)−
1
γI
M∑
k=1
M∏
j=1
j 6=k
AREj ,RD,D (1)ASiEj ,SiR,R (1)50)
× (AREk,RD,D (1)ASiEk,SiR,Si,R +ASiEk,SiR,R (1)AREk,RD,R,D) ,
• LRmSiR > LEkmSJEk
SOP (i,k,J) ∼ 1−
M∏
k=1
AREk,RD,D (1) (38)
−
∑M
k=1
∏M
j=1
j 6=k
AREj ,RD,D (1)
γI
×AREk,RD,R,D
(
1− P (SJEk) C(i,k,J)2
)
,
• LRmSiR = LEkmSJEk = 1
SOP (i,J) ∼ 1−
M∏
k=1
AREk,RD,D (1) +
log (γI)
γI
(39)
×
M∑
k=1
M∏
j=1
j 6=k
AREj ,RD,D (1)AREk,RD,D (1) C(i,k,J)3 .
• LRmSiR = LEkmSJEk and LEkmSJEk > 1
SOP (i,J) ∼ 1−
M∏
k=1
AREk,RD,D (1)−
1
γI
M∑
k=1
M∏
j=1
j 6=k
×AREj ,RD,D (1)AREk,RD,R,D, (40)
where P (q) = 1 − sgn (Lvmq − 1) , q = {SiR, SJEk}, sgn stands for sign function
A•,•,• (•), A•,•,•,•, and
(
C(i,k,J)l
)
l={1,2,3}
are defined in (51), (52), and (53)-(55), respectively.
Proof: The proof is provided in Appendix B.
IV. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, we validate the derived analytical results through Monte Carlo simulation by
generating 106 Gamma-distributed random variables. The setting parameters of the simulation
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Ae,c,v (y) = 1
Γ (Lvme) Γ(mc)
G1,22,2
 λe
λcγ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ −Lvmc + y, 1;−Lvme; 0
 , e = {SiEk, REk}, c = {SiR,RD}, y = {1, 2}, v = {R,D}
(51)
Ae,c,u,v =

λc(Lvmc−1)Ae,c,v(2)
Γ(muP )
[
δγ (muP , ϕu) +
Γ(muP+1,ϕu)
λuP
]
− ξcAe,c,v(1)
Γ(muP )
[
δ
(
γ (muP , ϕu) + ϕ
muP−1
R e
−ϕu)+ muP
λuP
Γ (muP , ϕu)
]
 , u = {Si, R}, v = {R,D}
(52)
are summarized in Table 1. Indeed, the values of fading severity parameter m• have been chosen
such that the wiretap channel is better than the legitimate one. Moreover, their values are taken
integer in the range 2..5 similarly to [6] and [20]. On the other hand, the average SNR, which
is inversely proportional to λ•, the legitimate link is considered better than the one of the
wiretap channel. It is worthwhile that these parameters are associated with all figures except
those indicating other values. As one can see in Figs. 2-5, all closed-form and simulation curves
are perfectly matched for considered parameters’ values.
Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 depict closed-form and asymptotic expressions for the SOP versus γI for
various values of antennas’ numbers in both the presence and absence of a friendly jammer
cases, respectively. As stated in remark 1, It can be noticed that the greater γI , the smaller the
SOP. Interestingly, above a certain threshold of γI the SOP becomes steady this can be obviously
justified from (8) and (9) that above that threshold, both sources and relay will always transmit
with their maximum powers. Consequently, the legitimate and wiretap capacities of each hop
TABLE I: Simulation parameters.
Parameter M N λSiR λSiP λSiEk
value 3 4 0.1 0.3 0.6
Parameter λREk λRP λRD mSiR mSiP
value 0.6 0.2 0.1 2 3
Parameter mSiEk mRD mREk mRP
value 5 2 4 3
14
C(i,k,J)1 =
1
Γ (mSiP )

[
γ (mSiP , ϕSi)σ
LRmSiR
i +
Γ(mSiP+LRmSiR,ϕSi)
λ
LRmSiR
SiP
]
ξ
LRmSiR
SiR
LRmSiRΓ(LRmSiR)
+ γα
(k,J)
i
∑LRmSiR−1
l=0 Υl
×
[
γ(mSiP ,ϕSi)
σ
−LRmSiR+l+1
i
+
Γ(mSiP+LRmSiR−l−1,ϕSi)
λ
LRmSiR
−l−1
SiP
]
Γ(LEkmSJEk−l−1)Γ(LEkmSiEk+l+1)
l+1
×
[
γ (mSJP , ϕJ)
(
δλSJEk
λSiEk
)l+1
+ Γ (mSJP + l + 1, ϕJ)
(
ς
(k,J)
i
)l+1]

,
(53)
C(i,k,J)2 ∼
γLRmSiRα
(k,J)
i
LEkmSJEk
[
γ (mSJP , ϕJ)
(
δλSJEk
λSiEk
)LEkmSJEk
+ Γ (mSJP + LEkmSJEk , ϕJ)
(
ς
(k,J)
i
)LEkmSJEk](54)
×
LEkmSiEk−1∑
h=0
Ω
(i,k)
h Γ (LEkmSiEk + LRmSiR − LEkmSJEk − h− 1) Γ (LEkmSJEk + h+ 1)(
$
(k)
i
)LEkmSiEk+LRmSiR−LEkmSJEk−h−1 ,
remain constant, leading to a constant value of SOP. Interestingly, by comparing the SOP values
in the two aforementioned figures, one can ascertain that better secrecy is achieved by using
a friendly jammer. In addition, the asymptotic curves are plotted under the considered fading
severity values (i.e., mSiR = 2, mSJEk = 5) from Eqs. (37), (51)-(53). Clearly, the asymptotic
curves match with the closed-form ones in high SNR regime.
Fig. 4 illustrates the SOP versus γSJ for numerous values of branches’ number LD at the
receiver D. Again, as indicated in remark 1, one can realize that the higher γSJ and LD, the
smaller the SOP and therefore the system’s security gets improved.
Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 show the SOP as a function of the number of eavesdroppers M for different
values of γSJ and by considering both cases i.e., presence and absence of jammer. One can
observe that the smaller γSJ or the greater M the worst is the system’s secrecy as highlighted in
remark 1 and 2, respectively. In addition, introducing a jamming signal improves significantly the
secrecy performance for high values of γSJ or in the presence of small numbers of eavesdroppers.
Fig. 7 depicts the SOP as a function of the number of eavesdroppers by considering the presence
and absence of a friendly jammer. It is worth mentioning that better security is obviously achieved
for the case of presence of jammer and multi-antenna nodes, while the scenario of the absence of
jammer and legitimate nodes equipped with a single antenna is the worst case. For this reason, our
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C(i,k,J)3 =
γLRmSiRα
(k,J)
i
$LRmSiR−LEkmSJEk
[
γ (mSJP , ϕJ)
(
δλSJEk
λSiEk
)LEkmSJEk
+
(
ς
(k,J)
i
)LEkmSJEk
Γ (mSJP + LEkmSJEk , ϕJ)
]
(55)
(−1)LEkmSJEk−LRmSiR Γ (LEkmSiEk + LEkmSJEk)
LEkmSJEk
.
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Fig. 2: SOP vs γI for different values of antennas at the destination in the presence of a friendly
jammer for η = σi = δ = 0.1 and LR = LEk = LD = L.
aim here is to investigate if the security gets enhanced when having artificial noise and legitimate
nodes with a single antenna or the scenario of the absence of jammer and all legitimate nodes
are equipped with multiple antennas. One can obviously notice that the system’s security is
improved when diversity is used at the legitimate nodes. Additionally, in the presence of an
important number of eavesdroppers, the friendly jammer does not contribute to the enhancement
of the system’s security.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, the physical layer security of a dual-hop underlay uplink CRN operating under
Nakagami-m fading channels was investigated. We considered multiple sources communicating,
in turn, with the base station through a relay in the presence of several eavesdroppers attempting
to overhear the communication channels. All receivers, i.e., legitimates and wiretappers, were
assumed to be equipped with multiple antennas and perform the MRC technique. Closed-form
and asymptotic expressions for the SOP under various cases of fading parameters’ values were
16
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Fig. 3: SOP vs γI in the absence of a friendly jammer for σi = δ = 0.1 and LR = LEk = LD = L.
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Fig. 4: SOP vs γSJ for different values of antennas at the destination for γI = γSi = γR = 20
dB and LR = LEk = LD = L.
derived by considering two scenarios namely, (i) presence and (ii) absence of a friendly jammer.
The obtained results showed that the best secrecy is achieved in the presence of a small number
of eavesdroppers when increasing the transmit power of the SUs’, the number of antennas
at the legitimate receiver and the maximum tolerated interference power at the PU as well.
Interestingly, we showed that equipping the legitimate nodes by multiple antennas leads to a
noticeable enhancement of the system’s security rather than sending an artificial noise. As future
work, we intend to investigate the impact of NOMA jointly with the key parameters considered
in this work on the system’s secrecy. We also intend to consider the case of amplify-and-forward
17
M
5 10 15 20 25 30
SO
P
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Closed-form with Jammer
Closed-form without Jammer
Simulations
γSJ = −5 dB
γSJ = −10 dB
γSJ = 0 dB
γSJ = 5 dB
Fig. 5: SOP vs number of eavesdroppers and different values γSJ for LD = 4 and γI = γSi =
γR = 20 dB.
302520
M
151050-20
-10
γSJ (dB)
0
10
0.6
0.8
1
0
0.2
0.4
20
SO
P
LE=LR=LD=4
LD=4, LR=LE=1 
Fig. 6: SOP vs number of eavesdroppers and γSJ for γI = γSi = γR = 20 dB.
relaying protocol and investigate the impact of numerous jammer selection policies on the overall
system’s security.
APPENDIX A: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
A. Expression of SOP at the First Hop
The SOP at the first hop in the absence and presence of a friendly jammer is given, respectively,
by
SOP
(i,k)
1 = 1− γ
∫ ∞
x=0
fgSiP (x)Ξ
(i,k)
2 (x) dx, (56)
18
M
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
SO
P
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Closed-form with Jammer
Closed-form without Jammer
Simulations
LR = LD = 2
LR = LD = 3
LR = LD = 4
LEk = 4, 3, 2
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SOP
(i,k,J)
1 = 1− γ
∫ ∞
x=0
fgSiP (x)Ξ
(i,k,J)
1 (x) dx, (57)
where (57) and (56) hold by using integration by parts on [23, Eq. (33)] , with
Ξ
(i,k,J)
1 (x) =
∫ ∞
0
f
γ
(i)
R |gSiP=x
(γy + γ − 1)F
γ
(i,k,J)
1E |gSiP=x
(y)dy, (58)
and
Ξ
(i,k)
2 (x) =
∫ ∞
0
f
γ
(i)
R |gSiP=x
(γy + γ − 1)F
γ
(i,k)
1E |gSiP=x
(y)dy, (59)
and γ is being defined in Theorem 1.
• Conditional CDF of γ(i)R
The CDF of γ(i)R for a given gSiP can be expressed as
F
γ
(i)
R |gSiP=x
(z) = Pr
(
min
(
γSi ,
γI
x
)
ESiR ≤ z
)
(60)
= FESiR
(
z
Φ (x)
)
,
where ESiR =
∑LR
u=1 gSiRu , Φ (x) = γSi for x ≤ γI/γSi and Φ (x) = γI/x for x > γI/γSi .
1) SOP at the First Hop with the Absence of a Jamming Signal: The conditional CDF of
γ
(i,k)
1E can be expressed as
F
γ
(i,k)
1E |gSiP=x
(y) = Pr
(
min
(
γSi ,
γI
x
)
ESiEk ≤ y
)
= FESiEk
(
y
Φ (x)
)
. (61)
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where ESiEk =
∑LR
u=1 gSiE(u)k
.
It is worth mentioning that for i.i.d Nakagami-m channels, ESiR and ESiEk are Gamma
distributed with shape and scale parameters LRmSiR and λSiR, LEkmSiEk and λSiEk , respectively.
Substituting (60) and (61) into (59), and using [24, Eqs. (06.06.26.0004.01), (07.34.21.0088.01]
yields
Ξ
(i,k)
2 (x) =
λ
LRmSiR
SiR
e−
ξSiR
Φ(x)
ΦLRmSiR (x) Γ (LEkmSiEk) Γ(LRmSiR)
LRmSiR−1∑
l=0
Υ
(i)
l (62)
×
(
λSiRγ
Φ (x)
)−l−1
G1,22,2
 λSiEk
λSiRγ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ −l, 1;−LEkmSiEk ; 0
 ,
where Υ(i)l is defined in (35).
Now, replacing (62) into (56), one can obtain
SOP
(i,k)
1 = 1−
λ
LRmSiR
SiR
γ
Γ (LEkmSiEk) Γ(LRmSiR)
LRmSiR−1∑
l=0
Υ
(i)
l
(γλSiR)
l+1
×H1G1,22,2
 λSiEk
λSiRγ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ −l, 1;−LEkmSiEk ; 0
 , (63)
where
H1 =
∫ ∞
0
fgSiP (x)e
− ξSiR
Φ(x)
ΦLRmSiR−l−1 (x)
dx (64)
(a)
=
γ
−LRmSiR+l+1
I
Γ (mSiP )

e
−
σiξSiR
γI
σ
−LRmSiR+l+1
i
γ (mSiP , ϕSi)
+
λ
mSiP
SiP
Γ
(
LRmSiR+mSiP−l−1,ϕSi+
ξSiR
γSi
)
(
λSiP+
ξSiR
γI
)LRmSiR+mSiP−l−1
 ,
where step (a) is obtained by replacing Φ (x) by its values, and performing some algebraic
manipulations.
Now, incorporating (64) into (63), (25) is attained.
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2) SOP at the First Hop in the Presence of a Jamming Signal: In the presence of a friendly
jammer, the CDF of γ(i,k,J)1E for a given gSiP is given by
F
γ
(i,k,J)
1E |gSiP=x
(y)
(a)
=
∫ ∞
0
FESiEk
(
y (t+ 1)
Φ (x)
)
(65a)
× f
W
(J)
k
(t) dt
(b)
= 1−Ψ(k)i (y) (65b)
×
LEkmSiEk−1∑
h=0
(
LEkmSiEk − 1
h
)
V(h)(y),
where W (J)k = min
(
γSJ ,
γP
gSJP
)
ESJEk , ESJEk =
∑LEk
u=1 gSJE(u)k
, V(h)(y) = ∫∞
0
the−
yλSiEk
Φ(x)
tF
W
(J)
k
(t) dt,
Ψ
(k)
i (y) =
yfSiEk(
y
Φ(x))
Φ(x)
. Here step (65a) holds using the definition (15), while step (65b) is
obtained by using integration by parts alongside the Binomial formula for a positive integer
LEkmSiEk . Importantly, the derivation of the CDF of γ
(i,k,J)
1E requires the one of W
(J)
k , given as
F
W
(J)
k
(t) = Pr
(
ESJEk ≤
t
γSJ
,
γI
gSJP
≥ γSJ
)
(66)
+ Pr
(ESJEk
gSJP
≤ t
γI
,
γI
gSJP
≤ γSJ
)
= FESJEk
(
t
γSJ
)
FgSJP
(
γI
γSJ
)
+ I(k,J)1 .
where
I(k,J)1 =
∫ ∞
γI
γSJ
fgSJP (ν)FESJEk
(
t
γI
ν
)
dν (67)
(a)
=
∫
L1
Γ (mSJP − s, ϕJ) Γ (LEkmSJEk + s) Γ (−s)
2pijΓ (1− s) (κt)s
(
β
(J)
k
)−1 ds
= β
(J)
k ∆
(J)
k (t) ,
where j =
√−1, L1 is a vertical line of integration chosen such as to separate the left poles of the
above integrand function from the right ones, ∆(J)k (t) = G
1,2
2,2
κt
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (1−mSJP , ϕJ) , (1, 0);−(LEkmSJEk , 0); (0, 0)
,
κ = λSJEk/λSJPγI , ϕJ , and β
(J)
k are defined in Theorem 1 and (34), respectively. Step (a)
holds using [24, Eq. (06.06.26.0004.01)] alongside with (1) and (2). As mentioned above, ESJEk
is also Gamma distributed with parameters LEkmSJEk and λSJEk .
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Substituting (67) into (66), we get
F
W
(J)
k
(t) = β
(J)
k
 γ (LEkmSJEk , λSJEkγSJ t)
×γ (mSJP , ϕJ) + ∆(J)k (t)
 . (68)
Now, it remains to compute V(h)(y) so as to evaluate (65b). Using (68), yields
V(h)(y) = β(J)k
(
γ (mSJP , ϕJ) T (h)1 + T (h)2
)
, (69)
where
T (h)1 =
∫ ∞
0
the−
yλSiEk
Φ(x)
tγ
(
LEkmSJEk ,
λSJEk
γSJ
t
)
dt
(a)
=
∫ ∞
0
the−
yλSiEk
Φ(x)
t
×G1,11,2
λSJEk
γSJ
t
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1;−LEkmSJEk ; 0
 dt
(b)
=
(
Φ (x)
λSiEky
)h+1
Θ
(h)
1 (y) , (70)
with Θ(h)1 (y) = G
1,2
2,2
 θ(k,J)i Φ(x)
y
∣∣∣∣∣∣ −h, 1;−LEkmSJEk ; 0
 and θ(k,J)i is being defined in Theorem 1. The
equalities (a) and (b) follow by using Eqs. (06.06.26.0004.01) and (07.34.21.0088.01) of [24],
respectively.
On the other hand, the term T (h)2 can be expressed as
T (h)2 =
∫ ∞
0
the−
yλSiEk
Φ(x)
t∆
(J)
k (t) dt
=
1
2pij
(
Φ (x)
λSiEky
)h+1 ∫
L2
Γ (1 + h− s) Γ (−s)
Γ (1− s)
× Γ (mSJP − s, ϕJ) Γ (LEkmSJEk + s)
(
η
y
)−s
ds
=
(
Φ (x)
λSiEky
)h+1
Θ
(h)
2 (y) , (71)
where Θ(h)2 (y) = G
1,3
3,2
η
y
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (ζJ , ϕJ) , (1, 0), (−h, 0);−(LEkmSJEk , 0); (0, 0)
 , η = ς(k,J)i Φ(x)
γI
, ζJ = 1 −mSJP , and
ς
(k,J)
i is being defined in Theorem 1.
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Finally, the conditional CDF of γ(i,k,J)1E can be expressed by substituting (70) and (71) into
(69) and then replacing it into (65b), yields
F
γ
(i,k,J)
1E |gSiP=x
(y) = 1−Ψ(k)i (y) β(J)k
×
LEkmSiEk−1∑
h=0
(LEkmSiEk−1
h
)
Φh+1 (x)
(λSiEky)
h+1
×
 γ (mSJP , ϕJ) Θ(h)1 (y)
+Θ
(h)
2 (y)
 . (72)
Now, the remaining last previous step in this proof consists of computing Ξ(i,k,J)1 (x) . Indeed,
by differentiating (60) and using (1) alongside with (72), (58) can be rewritten for a positive
integer LRmSiR as
Ξ
(i,k,J)
1 (x) =
Γ
(
LRmSiR,
ξSiR
Φ(x)
)
γΓ(LRmSiR)
− α(k,J)i
LEkmSiEk−1∑
h=0
Ω
(i,k)
h e
− ξSiR
Φ(x)
(Φ (x))LEkmSiEk+LRmSiR−h−2
×
LRmSiR−1∑
l=0
Υ
(i)
l
[
γ (mSJP , ϕJ)U (h,l)1 + U (h,l)2
]
, (73)
where ξSiR, Ω
(i,k)
h , α
(k,J)
i , and Υ
(i)
l are defined in (30), (32), (33), (35), respectively, and
U (h,l)a =
∫ ∞
0
yLEkmSiEk+l−h−1e−
$
(k)
i
Φ(x)
yΘ(h)a (y) dy, a = {1, 2}, (74)
with $(k)i is being defined in Theorem 1.
The two above terms can be expressed as
U (h,l)1 =
(
Φ (x)
$
(k)
i
)l+LEkmSiEk−h
M(h,l)1
(
$
(k)
i θ
(k,J)
i
)
, (75)
U (h,l)2 =
1
2pij
∫
L3
Γ (LEkmSiEk + l − h+ s) Γ (mSJP − s, ϕJ)(
Φ(x)
$
(k)
i
)−LEkmSiEk−l+h
Γ (1− s)
× Γ (LEkmSJEk + s) Γ (−s) Γ (1 + h− s)(
ς
(k,J)
i $
(k)
i
γI
)s ds,
=
(
Φ (x)
$
(k)
i
)LEkmSiEk+l−h
M(h,l)2
(
ς
(k,J)
i $
(k)
i
γI
)
, (76)
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whereM(h,l)1 (•) andM(h,l)2 (•) are defined in (27) and (28), respectively. Note that (75) follows
relying on [24, Eq. (07.34.21.0088.01)].
Henceforth, substituting (75) and (76) into (73), yields
Ξ
(i,k,J)
1 (x) =
Γ
(
LRmSiR,
ξSiR
Φ(x)
)
γΓ(LRmSiR)
− α(k,J)i
LEkmSiEk−1∑
h=0
Ω
(i,k)
h e
− ξSiR
Φ(x)
(Φ (x))LEkmSiEk+LRmSiR−h−2
×
LRmSiR−1∑
l=0
Υ
(i)
l
(
Φ (x)
$
(k)
i
)LEkmSiEk+l−h
×
 γ (mSJP , ϕJ)M(h,l)1
(
$
(k)
i θ
(k,J)
i
)
+M(h,l)2
(
ς
(k,J)
i $
(k)
i
γP
)  . (77)
Now, replacing (77) into (57), we obtain
SOP
(i,k,J)
1 = 1−
Λ1
Γ(LRmSiR)
+ γα
(k,J)
i
×
LEkmSiEk−1∑
h=0
Ω
(i,k)
h
LRmSiR−1∑
l=0
Υ
(i)
l Λ2(
$
(k)
i
)l+LEkmSiEk−h
×
 γ (mSJP , ϕJ)M(h,l)1
(
$
(k)
i θ
(k,J)
i
)
+M(h,l)2
(
ς
(k,J)
i $
(k)
i
γI
)  , (78)
where
Λ1 =
∫ ∞
0
fgSiP (x)Γ
(
LRmSiR,
ξSiR
Φ (x)
)
dx
(a)
=
1
Γ (mSiP )
 γ (mSiP , ϕSi) Γ(LRmSiR, ξSiRγSi )
+M3
(
ξSiR
λSiP γP
)
 , (79)
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Λ2 =
∫ ∞
0
fgSiP (x)e
− ξSiR
Φ(x)
(Φ (x))LRmSiR−l−1
dx
=
γ (mSiP , ϕSi) e
− ξSiR
γSi
Γ (mSiP ) γ
LRmSiR−l−1
Si
+
λ
mSiP
SiP
Γ (mSiP ) γ
LRmSiR−l−1
I
×
Γ
(
mSiP + LRmSiR − l − 1, ϕSi + ξSiRγSi
)
(
λSiP +
ξSiR
γP
)mSiP+LRmSiR−l−1 , (80)
with M3 (•) is defined in (31). Equality (a) holds by replacing Φ (x) by their values and along
using [24, Eqs. (06.06.26.0005.01), (07.34.21.0088.01)].
By substituting (79) and (80) into (78), (24) is attained.
B. Expression of SOP at the Second Hop
In like manner to SOP (i,k)1 , SOP
(k)
2 can be expressed as
SOP
(k)
2 = 1− γ
∫ ∞
0
fgRP (x)Ξ
(k)
3 (x) dx, (81)
with
Ξ
(k)
3 (x) =
∫ ∞
0
fγD|gRP=x (γ + γy − 1)Fγ(k)2E |gRP=x (y) dy. (82)
One can notice from (82) that in order to calculate SOP (k)2 , it is necessary to find first the
conditional CDFs of γD and γ
(k)
2E for a given gRP .
• Conditional CDFs of γD and γ
(k)
2E
Let’s define YRD =
∑L
t=1 gRDt . In a similar manner to (60), the conditional CDFs of γD and
γ
(k)
2E are given, respectively, by
FγD|gRP=x(z) = FYRD
(
z
D (x)
)
, (83)
F
γ
(k)
2E |gRP=x
(y) = FEREk
(
y
D(x)
)
, (84)
where EREk =
∑LEk
u=1 gRE(u)k
, D (x) = γR for x ≤ γI/γR and D (x) = γI/x for x > γI/γR.
It follows, in a similar manner to ESiR, that EREk is also Gamma distributed with parameters
LEkmREk and λREk .
• Expression of Ξ(k)3 (x)
25
It is worthwhile that YRD is Gamma distributed for i.i.d Nakagami-m random variables with
shape and scale parameters LDmRD and λRD, respectively. That is
Ξ
(k)
3 (x)
(a)
=
λLDmRDRD e
− ξRDD(x)
Γ(LDmRD)Γ (LEkmREk) (D (x))LDmRD−1
×
LDmRD−1∑
j=0
Bjγj
∫ ∞
0
yje−
λRDγ
D(x) yγ
(
LEkmREk ,
λ
REk
D(x)y
)
(b)
=
λLDmRDRD e
− ξRDD(x)
γΓ(LDmRD)Γ (LEkmREk)DLDmRD−1 (x)
×
LDmRD−1∑
j=0
Bj
(D (x)
λRD
)j+1
G1,22,2
 λREk
λRDγ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ −j, 1;−LEkmREk ; 0
 , (85)
where Bj is defined in (36). Note that step (a) holds by substituting (83) and (84) into (82),
while equality (b) follows by using [24, Eqs. (06.06.26.0004.01), (07.34.21.0088.01)].
Substituting (85) into (81), yields
SOP
(k)
2 = 1−
λLDmRDRD
Γ (LEkmREk) Γ(LDmRD)
LDmRD−1∑
j=0
Bj
λj+1RD
× JjG1,22,2
 λREk
λRDγ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ −j, 1;−LEkmREk ; 0
 , (86)
where
Jj=
∫ ∞
0
fgRP (x) (D (x))−LDmRD+j+1 e−
ξRD
D(x)dx
(a)
=
1
Γ(mRP )

e
− ξRDγR γ(mRP ,ϕR)
γ
LDmRD−j−1
R
+
λ
mRP
RP Γ
(
υj ,ϕR+
ξRD
γR
)
γ
LDmRD−j−1
I
(
ξRD
γI
+λRP
)υj
 , (87)
where υj = LDmRD +mRP − j − 1, ϕR is defined in Theorem 1. Here step (a) is obtained by
replacing D (x) by its values and using (1) alongside with Eqs. (3.381.1) and (3.381.3) of [21].
By considering γI
γR
= δ and substituting (87) into (86), one can obtain (26) which concludes
the proof.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 2
In this section, we make use of the residues theorem in order to find the approximate
expressions of Meijer-G’s function given in (24).
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A. Asymptotic Expression of SOP (i,k,J)1
1) Case 1: Presence of Jammer: The Meijer-G’s functionsM(h,l)1 (z) andM(h,l)2 (z) given in
(24) can be expressed in terms of complex integral as
M(h,l)1 (z) =
1
2pij
∫
L3
Γ (LEkmSJEk + s) Γ (1 + h− s)
Γ (1− s)
× Γ (LEkmSiEk + l − h+ s) Γ (−s) z−sds, (88)
and
M(h,l)2 (z) =
1
2pij
∫
L3
Γ (LEkmSJEk + s) Γ (1 + h− s)
Γ (1− s)
× Γ (LEkmSiEk + l − h+ s) Γ (−s)
× Γ (mSJP − s, ϕJ) z−sds. (89)
It is noteworthy that the conditions of [22, Theorem 1.5] are satisfied. That is, the two above
functions can be written as an infinite sum of the poles belonging to the left half plan of L3.
Furthermore, as the upper incomplete gamma function in (89) is always finite for ϕJ 6= 0, it
follows that the integrand functions of the two above equations have the same poles. Additionally,
it is clearly seen that the order of the left poles depends on the values of LEkmSJEk , LEkmSiEk ,
h, and l. Owing to this fact, three cases can be distinguished:
• −LEkmSJEk < −LEkmSiEk − l+ h: In this case, the two integrand functions given in (88)
and (89) admit −χh,l,r with χh,l,r = LEkmSiEk + l − h + r and 0 ≤ r ≤ LEkmSJEk −
LEkmSiEk − l + h − 1 as simple poles and −%r with %r = LEkmSJEk + r and r natural
number as poles of second-order.
• −LEkmSJEk > −LEkmSiEk − l + h : Under this condition, the aforementioned integrands
have −%r with 0 ≤ r ≤ LEkmSiEk − LEkmSJEk + l − h − 1 as simple poles and −χh,l,r
where r ∈ N as poles of second-order.
• −LEkmSJEk = −LEkmSiEk − l+ h : Under this assumption, the two integrands admit only
poles of second-order at −%r, r ∈ N.
a. −LEkmSJEk< −LEkmSiEk−l + h
Relied on [22, Theorem 1.5], M(h,l)1 (z) can be rewritten as series of residues at the afore-
mentioned poles
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M(h,l)1 (z) =
%r−χh,l,r−1∑
r=0
lim
s→−χh,l,r
Q1 (s, z)
+
∞∑
r=0
lim
s→−%r
∂Q2 (s, z)
∂s
, (90)
where
Q1 (s, z) = (χh,l,r + s) Γ (χh,l,r − r + s)
× Γ (LEkmSJEk + s) Γ (−s) Γ (1 + h− s)
Γ (1− s) z
−s, (91)
and
Q2 (s, z) = (%r + s)
2Γ (LEkmSiEk + l − h+ s)
× Γ (LEkmSJEk + s) Γ (−s) Γ (1 + h− s)
Γ (1− s) z
−s.
(92)
Obviously, the limit of Q1 (s, z) can be expressed as
lim
s→−χh,l,r
Q1 (s, z) =
(−1)r Γ (LEkmSiEk + l + r + 1)
r!χh,l,r
× Γ (LEkmSJEk − χh,l,r) zχh,l,r . (93)
On the other hand, using [24, Eqs. (06.14.06.0026.01) and (06.14.16.0003.01)] the partial deriva-
tive of Q2 (s, z) is given by
∂Q2 (s, z)
∂s
=
(s+ %r)
2Γ (χh,l,r − r + s) Γ (−s)
Γ (1− s) zs
× Γ (LEkmSJEk + s) Γ (1 + h− s)G(h,l,r) (z, s) , (94)
where G(h,l,r) (z, s) = − log z + ψ(r + 1) + ψ(%r − χh,l,r + r + 1)− 1s − ψ(1 + h− s).
Replacing (94) and (93) into (90), yields
M(h,l)1 (z) =
%r−χh,l,r−1∑
r=0
(−1)r Γ (LEkmSJEk − χh,l,r)
r!χh,l,r
× Γ (LEkmSiEk + l + r + 1) zχh,l,r
+
∞∑
r=0
(−1)%r−χh,l,r Γ (h+ %r + 1)
(−LEkmSiEk + %r − l + h)!k!%r
× z%rG(h,l,r) (z,−%r) . (95)
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In similar manner,M(h,l)2 (z) can be expressed as
M(h,l)2 (z) =
%r−χh,l,r−1∑
k=0
(−1)r Γ (LEkmSiEk + l + r + 1)
r!χh,l,rz−χh,l,r
× Γ (mSJP + χh,l,r, ϕJ) Γ (LEkmSJEk − χh,l,r)
+
∞∑
r=0
(−1)%r−χh,l,r Γ (1 + h+ %r)
(−LEkmSiEk + %r − l + h)!r!%r
z%r
×

[G(h,l,r) (z,−%r)− log (ϕJ)]
×Γ (mSJP + %r, ϕJ)− V(r) (%r)
 ,
(96)
where V(r) (%r) =G3,02,3
ϕJ
∣∣∣∣∣∣ −; 1, 10, 0,mSJP + %r;−
 .
Interestingly, one can notice that %r > χh,l,r for LEkmSJEk > LEkmSiEk + l−h. Consequently,
the second summation in the two above expressions can be ignored as z approaches 0, i.e.,
M(h,l)1 (z) ∼
Γ (LEk(mSJEk −mSiEk)− l + h)
(LEkmSiEk + l − h)
,
× Γ (LEkmSiEk + l + 1) zLEkmSiEk+l−h (97)
and
M(h,l)2 (z) ∼
Γ (LEkmSiEk + l + 1) z
LEkmSiEk+l−h
(LEkmSiEk + l − h)
× Γ (LEk(mSJEk −mSiEk)− l + h)
× Γ (mSJP + LEkmSiEk + l − h, ϕJ) . (98)
b. −LEkmSJEk> −LEkmSiEk−l + h
Analogously to the previous case, the integrals (88) and (89) can be computed relied on [22,
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Theorem 1.5] and [24, Eq. (06.14.16.0003.01)], respectively, as
M(h,l)1 (z) =
χh,l,r−%r−1∑
r=0
Γ (LEkmSiEk + l − h− %r) Γ (1 + h+ %r)
r!%r (−1)−r z−%r
+
∞∑
r=0
(−1)χh,l,r−%r Γ (1 + h+ χh,l,r)
(χh,l,r − LEkmSJEk)!r!χh,l,rz−χh,l,r
×
 ψ(r + 1) + ψ(−LEkmSJEk + χh,l,r + 1)−ψ(1 + LEkmSiEk + l + r) + 1χh,l,r − log z
 ,
(99)
and
M(h,l)2 (z) =
χh,l,r−%r−1∑
r=0
(−1)r Γ (LEkmSiEk + l − h− %r)
r!%r
× Γ (1 + h+ %r) z%rΓ (mSJP + %r, ϕJ)
+
∞∑
r=0
(−1)χh,l,r−%r Γ (1 + h+ χh,l,r)
(χh,l,r − %r)!r!χh,l,rz−χh,l,r
× [Z − V(r) (χh,l,r)] (100)
where
Z =Γ (mSJP + χh,l,r, ϕJ)

− log z + ψ(r + 1)
+ψ(−LEkmSJEk + χh,l,r + 1)
−ψ(LEkmSiEk + l − h+ r)
−ψ(LEkmSiEk + l + r + 1)
+ψ(1 + χh,l,r)− log (ϕJ)

. (101)
One can notice that as %r < χh,l,r, M(h,l)1 (z) and M(h,l)2 (z) can be approximated when z
tends to 0
M(h,l)1 (z) ∼
Γ (LEkmSiEk − LEkmSJEk + l − h)
LEkmSJEk
× Γ (LEkmSJEk + h+ 1) zLEkmSJEk (102)
and
M(h,l)2 (z) ∼
Γ (LEkmSJEk + h+ 1) Γ (mSJP + LEkmSJEk , ϕJ)
LEkmSJEk
× Γ (LEkmSiEk − LEkmSJEk + l − h) zLEkmSJEk . (103)
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c. −LEkmSJEk= −LEkmSiEk − l + h
For this case, the two complex integrals given in (88) and (89) can be expressed by performing
some algebraic operations as
M(h,l)1 (z) =
∞∑
r=0
(−1)%r−χh,l,r Γ (1 + h+ %r)
(−LEkmSiEk + %r − l + h)!k!%r
× z%rG(h,l,r) (z,−%r) . (104)
and
M(h,l)2 (z) =
∞∑
r=0
(−1)%r−χh,l,r Γ (1 + h+ %r)
(%r − LEkmSiEk − l + h)!r!%r
z%r
×

[G(h,l,r) (z)− log (ϕJ)]
×Γ (mSJP + %r, ϕJ)− V(r) (%r)
 .
(105)
Again, M(h,l)1 (z) and M(h,l)2 (z) can be approximated as z approaches 0 by
M(h,l)1 (z) ∼
(−1)LEkmSJEk−LRmSiR+1 zLEkmSJEk log z,
LEkmSJEk
× Γ (LEkmSiEk + LEkmSJEk) (106)
and
M(h,l)2 (z) ∼
(−1)LEkmSJEk−LRmSiR+1 Γ (LEk (mSiEk +mSJEk))
LEkmSJEk
× Γ (mSJP + LEkmSJEk , ϕJ) zLEkmSJEk log (z) . (107)
Finally, the Meijer’s G-function M3 (z) defined in (31) can be written in terms of complex
integral as
M3 (z) = 1
2pij
∫
L4
Γ (LRmSiR + s) Γ (mSiP − s, ϕSi)
s
z−sds. (108)
It is worth mentioning that the conditions of [22] are applied also here. Thus, the above integrand
function can be written as an infinite sum of the left poles in L4. Besides, that integrand admits
only poles of the first order at 0 and −LRmSiR − r, r ∈ N. That is
M3 (z) = Γ (LRmSiR) Γ (mSiP , ϕSi) (109)
+
∞∑
r=0
(−1)r+1 Γ (mSiP + LRmSiR + r, ϕSi)
r! (LRmSiR + r) z
−LRmSiR−r
(a)∼ Γ (LRmSiR) Γ (mSiP , ϕSi)−
Γ (mSiP + LRmSiR, ϕSi)
LRmSiRz
−LRmSiR
,
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with step (a) follows by considering only the first term of the infinite summation when z tends
to 0.
Finally, armed by [21, Eq. (8.354.2)] the upper incomplete Gamma given in (24) can be
approximated for small values of z as
Γ
(
LRmSiR,
σiξSiR
γI
)
∼ Γ (LRmSiR)−
1
LRmSiR
(
σiξSiR
γI
)LRmSiR
. (110)
Interestingly, the SOP (i,k,J)1 can finally be approximated in high SNR regime (i.e., γI →
∞) by considering three cases, namely LRmSiR < LEkmSJEk , LRmSiR > LEkmSJEk , and
LRmSiR = LEkmSJEk .
• LRmSiR < LEkmSJEk
Substituting (97), (98), (109), and (110) into (24), and by considering h = LEkmSiEk−1,
SOP
(i,k,J)
1 can be approximated as
SOP
(i,k,J)
1 ∼
C(i,k,J)1
γ
LRmSiR
I
, (111)
where C(i,k,J)1 is given in (53).
• LRmSiR > LEkmSJEk
Incorporating (102), (103), (109), and (110) into (24), and by considering l = LRmSiR−1,
SOP
(i,k,J)
1 can be approximated as
SOP
(i,k,J)
1 ∼
C(i,k,J)2
γ
LEkmSJEk
I
, (112)
where C(i,k,J)2 is given in (54).
• LRmSiR = LEkmSJEk
Replacing (102), (103), (106), (107), (109), and (110) into (24), and by considering l =
LRmSiR−1, SOP (i,k,J)1 can be approximated as
SOP
(i,k,J)
1 ∼ C(i,k,J)3
log (γI)
γ
LEkmSJEk
I
, (113)
where C(i,k,J)3 is given in (55).
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2) Case 2: Absence of a Friendly Jammer: In order to derive the asymptotic expression of
SOP
(i,k)
1 given in (25), we need to approximate the upper incomplete Gamma function. One
can ascertain by applying the Maclaurin series that
Γ (a, b+ cz) ∼ Γ (a, b)− czba−1e−b, (114)
as z tends to 0. By considering only the two cases i.e., l = LRmSiR − 1 and l = LRmSiR − 2
and performing some algebraic manipulations, one can obtain
SOP
(i,k)
1 ∼ 1−ASiEk,SiR,R −
ASiEk,SiR,Si,R
γI
, (115)
where A•,•,• and A•,•,•,• are defined in (51) and (52), respectively.
B. Asymptotic Expression of SOP (k)2
As SOP (i,k)1 and SOP
(k)
2 given in (25) and (26), respectively have the same shape, one can
see that
SOP
(k)
2 ∼ 1−AREk,RD −
AREk,RD,R
γI
, (116)
Finally, replacing (111), (112), (113), and (116) into (22), one can get the expressions (37)-
(40), respectively. Furthermore, substituting (115) and (116) into (23), (50) is attained which
concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
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